kubernetes Pod 容器 security context OPA（PSP替代方案）

2024-01-09 16:17:35

开头语

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security context 介绍

安全上下文（Security Context）定义 Pod 或 Container 的特权与访问控制设置。

安全上下文包括但不限于：

自主访问控制（Discretionary Access Control）：基于用户 ID（UID）和组 ID（GID）?来判定对对象（例如文件）的访问权限
安全性增强的 Linux（SELinux）：为对象赋予安全性标签。以特权模式或者非特权模式运行
Linux 权能: 为进程赋予 root 用户的部分特权而非全部特权
AppArmor：使用程序配置来限制个别程序的权能
Seccomp：过滤进程的系统调用
allowPrivilegeEscalation：控制进程是否可以获得超出其父进程的特权。此布尔值直接控制是否为容器进程设置?no_new_privs标志。当容器满足一下条件之一时，allowPrivilegeEscalation?总是为 true
1. 以特权模式运行，或者
2. 具有?CAP_SYS_ADMIN?权能
readOnlyRootFilesystem：以只读方式加载容器的根文件系统

Kubernetes API Reference Docs

Pod/all security context（OPA ）

PSP 问题

PSP不足与状况：

·将再1.21版本弃用PSP, 在1.25版本删除PSP

仅支持Pod策略, 使用复杂，权限模型存在缺陷，控制不明确

OPA 解决PSP的问题

原理

OPA(Open Policy Agent)：是以个开源的、通用策略引擎，把策略当作代码去写。

提供一个种高级声明性语言-Rgo来编写策略，并把决策这一步骤从复杂的业务逻辑中解耦出来。

Gatekeeper是基于OPA的一个Kubernetes策略解决方案，可替代PSP或者部分RBAC功能。

并且可以指定多个类型资源

当在集群中部署了Gatekeeper 组件，APIServer 所有的创建、更新或者删除操作都会触 Gatekeeper来处理，如果不满足策略则拒绝。

Gatekeeper的策略由两个资源对象组成：

Template: 策略逻辑实现的地方，使用rego语言
Contsraint: 负责kubernetes资源对象的过滤或者为Template提供输入参数

语言相对复杂，建议结合 chatgpt 来进行使用

Gatekeeper类似一个准入控制器，对资源对象向kubernetes api 调用进行过滤

资料

# 项目地址

https://github.com/open-policy-agent/gatekeeper

# 安装地址

https://open-policy-agent.github.io/gatekeeper/website/docs/install/

# 语法介绍地址

https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/#rego

安装

https://open-policy-agent.github.io/gatekeeper/website/docs/install/

[root@master opa]# kubectl create -f gatekeeper.yaml

namespace/gatekeeper-system created

resourcequota/gatekeeper-critical-pods created

customresourcedefinition.apiextensions.k8s.io/assign.mutations.gatekeeper.sh created

customresourcedefinition.apiextensions.k8s.io/assignmetadata.mutations.gatekeeper.sh created

customresourcedefinition.apiextensions.k8s.io/configs.config.gatekeeper.sh created

customresourcedefinition.apiextensions.k8s.io/constraintpodstatuses.status.gatekeeper.sh created

customresourcedefinition.apiextensions.k8s.io/constrainttemplatepodstatuses.status.gatekeeper.sh created

customresourcedefinition.apiextensions.k8s.io/constrainttemplates.templates.gatekeeper.sh created

customresourcedefinition.apiextensions.k8s.io/modifyset.mutations.gatekeeper.sh created

customresourcedefinition.apiextensions.k8s.io/mutatorpodstatuses.status.gatekeeper.sh created

customresourcedefinition.apiextensions.k8s.io/providers.externaldata.gatekeeper.sh created

serviceaccount/gatekeeper-admin created

role.rbac.authorization.k8s.io/gatekeeper-manager-role created

clusterrole.rbac.authorization.k8s.io/gatekeeper-manager-role created

rolebinding.rbac.authorization.k8s.io/gatekeeper-manager-rolebinding created

clusterrolebinding.rbac.authorization.k8s.io/gatekeeper-manager-rolebinding created

secret/gatekeeper-webhook-server-cert created

service/gatekeeper-webhook-service created

Warning: spec.template.metadata.annotations[container.seccomp.security.alpha.kubernetes.io/manager]: non-functional in v1.27+; use the "seccompProfile" field instead

deployment.apps/gatekeeper-audit created

deployment.apps/gatekeeper-controller-manager created

mutatingwebhookconfiguration.admissionregistration.k8s.io/gatekeeper-mutating-webhook-configuration created

validatingwebhookconfiguration.admissionregistration.k8s.io/gatekeeper-validating-webhook-configuration created

resource mapping not found for name: "gatekeeper-admin" namespace: "" from "gatekeeper.yaml": no matches for kind "PodSecurityPolicy" in version "policy/v1beta1"

ensure CRDs are installed first

resource mapping not found for name: "gatekeeper-controller-manager" namespace: "gatekeeper-system" from "gatekeeper.yaml": no matches for kind "PodDisruptionBudget" in version "policy/v1beta1"

ensure CRDs are installed first

[root@master opa]# kubectl get pod? -n gatekeeper-system

NAME???????????????????????????????????????????? READY?? STATUS??? RESTARTS?? AGE

gatekeeper-audit-5f64f9f48-h4rjc???????????????? 1/1???? Running?? 0????????? 6m12s

gatekeeper-controller-manager-64555779db-6q6xv?? 1/1???? Running?? 0????????? 6m12s

gatekeeper-controller-manager-64555779db-95q8l?? 1/1???? Running?? 0????????? 6m12s

gatekeeper-controller-manager-64555779db-cg9x2?? 1/1???? Running?? 0????????? 6m12s

示例

Pod禁止特权模式

psp是下面这样使用

OPA 使用方式如下

创建Template 模板

（安装后才有会ConstraintTemplate资源对象）

apiVersion: templates.gatekeeper.sh/v1beta1

kind: ConstraintTemplate

metadata:

? name: privileged

spec:

? crd:

??? spec:

????? names:

??????? kind: privileged # 与上面name保持一致

? targets: # 这个字段里面才是定义逻辑的核心

??? - target: admission.k8s.gatekeeper.sh

????? rego: | # 指定rego语言，|是代表多行

??????? package admission # 导入包

??????? violation[{"msg": msg}] {? # 如果violation为true说明违反约束，下面的逻辑通过了就是拒绝，没有通过就是拒绝

????????? containers = input.review.object.spec.template.spec.containers # 导入pod 中 containers 字段

????????? c_name := containers[0].name # 从上面导入的变量中再从中获取name字段?????????

????????? containers[0].securityContext.privileged # 再从上面导入变量中拿到特权字段，来进行判断，如果为True说明启用了这个特权，则违反约束

????????? # 整个violation 返回的就是一个true, 则说明违反约束

????????? msg := sprintf("提示：'%v'容器禁止启用特权！",[c_name]) # 如果违法则打印此消息

??????? }

获取的是类似下面的启用特权字段

? containers:

? - image: nginx:1.17.1

??? name: web

??? securityContext:

????? allowPrivilegeEscalation: false # 不允许提权

????? privileged: true? # 开启特权模式


[root@master opa]# kubectl apply -f privileged_tpl.yaml

constrainttemplate.templates.gatekeeper.sh/privileged created

[root@master opa]# kubectl get ConstraintTemplate

NAME???????? AGE

privileged?? 8s

创建 constraints 约束

（要先创建模板）

apiVersion: constraints.gatekeeper.sh/v1beta1

kind: privileged # 这个名字指定的是上面创建 ConstraintTemplate 中的name

metadata:

? name: privileged # 这个才是这个约束策略的名字

spec:

? match:? # 要匹配的资源

??? kinds:

????? - apiGroups: ["apps"]

??????? kinds:

??????? - "Deployment"

??????? - "DaemonSet"

??????? - "StatefulSet"

[root@master opa]# kubectl apply -f privileged_constraints.yaml

privileged.constraints.gatekeeper.sh/privileged created

[root@master opa]# cd .

NAME???????? AGE

privileged?? 12s

deploy 测试

apiVersion: apps/v1

kind: Deployment

metadata:

? labels:

??? app: web

? name: web

spec:

? replicas: 1

? selector:

??? matchLabels:

????? app: web

? strategy: {}

? template:

??? metadata:

????? creationTimestamp: null

????? labels:

??????? app: web

??? spec:

????? containers:

????? - image: busybox:1.30

??????? name: sc-cap

??????? command:

??????? - sleep

??????? - 12h

??????? securityContext:

????????? privileged: true

[root@master opa]# kubectl apply -f deploy.yaml

Error from server ([privileged] 提示：'opa-test'容器禁止启用特权！): error when creating "deploy.yaml": admission webhook "validation.gatekeeper.sh" denied the request: [privileged] 提示：'opa-test'容器禁止启用特权！

删除??????? securityContext:?? privileged: true 即可创建

只允许使用特定的镜像仓库

具体yaml解析可以看上面Pod禁止特权模式示例

判断镜像的开头是否匹配，如果没带域名就是dockerhub的

registry.aliyuncs.com/google_containers/pause???????????????????? 3.9?????? e6f181688397?? 13 months ago?? 744kB

centos??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? latest??? 5d0da3dc9764?? 2 years ago???? 231MB

apiVersion: templates.gatekeeper.sh/v1beta1

kind: ConstraintTemplate

metadata:

? name: image-check

spec:

? crd:

??? spec:

????? names:

??????? kind: image-check

????? validation:

??????? openAPIV3Schema:

????????? properties:? # 需要满足条件的参数，接收参数的固定语法

??????????? prefix:

????????????? type: string

? targets:

??? - target: admission.k8s.gatekeeper.sh

????? rego: |

??????? package image

??????? violation[{"msg": msg}] {

????????? containers = input.review.object.spec.template.spec.containers

????????? image := containers[0].image

????????? not startswith(image, input.parameters.prefix)

????????? # 镜像地址开头不匹配并取反则为True，说明违反约束

????????? msg := sprintf("提示：'%v'镜像地址不在可信任仓库！", [image])

??????? }

apiVersion: constraints.gatekeeper.sh/v1beta1

kind: image-check

metadata:

? name: image-check

spec:

? match:

??? kinds:

????? - apiGroups: ["apps"]

??????? kinds:

??????? - "Deployment"

??????? - "DaemonSet"

??????? - "StatefulSet"

? parameters:? # 传递给opa的参数，用于匹配镜像开头域名

??? prefix: "snj/"

测试

[root@master opa]# kubectl apply -f image-check_tpl.yaml

constrainttemplate.templates.gatekeeper.sh/image-check created

[root@master opa]# kubectl apply -f image-check_constraints.yaml

image-check.constraints.gatekeeper.sh/image-check created

???????下面 Deployment中使用的是dockerhub的镜像仓库

[root@master opa]# kubectl create deployment web1 --image=nginx:v1

error: failed to create deployment: admission webhook "validation.gatekeeper.sh" denied the request: [image-check] 提示：'nginx:v1'镜像地址不在可信任仓库！

[root@master opa]# kubectl create deployment web1 --image=snj/nginx:v1

deployment.apps/web1 created

Container security context

yaml 整体解析

apiVersion: v1

kind: Pod

metadata:

? labels:

??? run: web

? name: web3

? namespace: test

spec:

? securityContext:

??? runAsUser: 1000 # 镜像里必须有这个用户UID

??? fsGroup: 1000 # 数据卷挂载后的目录属组设置为该组

? containers:

? - image: nginx:1.17.1

??? name: web

??? securityContext:

????? allowPrivilegeEscalation: false # 不允许提权

????? privileged: true? # 开启特权模式

????? # 特权模式：在特权模式下运行容器,特权容器中的进程本质上相当于主机上的 root

????? Capabilities:

??????? add: ["SYS_ADMIN"]??

????? readOnlyRootFilesystem: true

????? # 只读挂载容器文件系统?????????

apiVersion: v1

kind: Pod

metadata:

? name: securitycontext-capabilities-demo

? namespace: default

spec:

? securityContext:??????????? #pod级别的安全上下文，对内部多有容器均有效

??? runAsUer <integer>??????? #以指定的用户身份运行容器进程，默认由镜像中的USER指定

??? runAsGroup <integer>????? #以指定的用户组运行容器进程，默认使用的组随容器运行时设定

??? supplementalGroups <[] integer>? #为容器中1号进程的用户添加的附加组

??? fsGroup <integer>???????? #为容器中的1号进程附加一个专用组，其功能类似于sgid

??? runAsNonRoot <boolean>??? #是否以非root身份运行

??? seLinuxOptions <object>?? #SELINUX的相关配置

??? sysctl <[] object>??????? #应用到当前pod名称空间级别的sysctl参数设置列表

??? windowsOptions <object>?? #windows容器专用配置

? containers：

? - name: ...

??? image: ...

??? securityContext:????? #容器级别的安全上下文，仅在当前容器生效

????? runAsUer <integer>??????? #以指定的用户身份运行容器进程，默认由镜像中的USER指定

????? runAsGroup <integer>????? #以指定的用户组运行容器进程，默认使用的组随容器运行时设定

????? runAsNonRoot <boolean>??? #是否以非root身份运行

????? allowPrivilegeEscalation <boolean> #是否允许特权升级

????? capabilities <object>???? #为当前容器添加或删除内核能力

??????? add <[] string>???????? #添加由列表定义的各项内核能力

??????? drop <[] string>??????? #移除由列表定义的各项内核能力

????? privileged <boolean>????? #是否允许为特权容器

????? procMount <string>??????? #设置容器procMount类型，默认为DefaultProcMount

????? readOnlyRootFilesystem <boolean>? #是否将根文件系统设置为只读模式

????? seLinuxOptions <object>?? #selinux相关配置

????? windowsOptions <object>?? #windows相关配置

指定程序运行用户

dockerfile（容器本身指定）

USER 字段

设置启动容器的用户，可以是用户名或UID，所以，只有下面的两种写法是正确的

USER daemo
USER UID

FROM python

RUN useradd python

RUN mkdir /data/www -p

COPY . /data/www

RUN chown -R python /data

RUN pip install flask -i https://mirrors.aliyun.com/pypi/simple/ && \

??? pip install prometheus_client -i https://mirrors.aliyun.com/pypi/simple/

WORKDIR /data/www

USER python

CMD python main.py # CMD 执行命令使用的用户是上面执行的用户

因为容器中跑的程序在宿主机中也是一个进程（k8s 可以解决这个问题）

如果使用 root 用户，在宿主机中也就等于root 去执行可能会导致这个程序权限过大，非常不安全

所以在 dockerfile 中执行 user

[root@master flask-demo]# docker run -d --name nginx-python nginx/python:v1

[root@master flask-demo]# docker ps -a | grep python

6440126bac3b?? nginx/python:v1???????????????????????????????????? "/bin/sh -c 'python …"?? About a minute ago?? Up About a minute??????????????????? nginx-python



[root@master flask-demo]# docker exec -it 644 /bin/bash

python@6440126bac3b:/data/www$ id

uid=1000(python) gid=1000(python) groups=1000(python)

python@6440126bac3b:/data/www$ ps -ef

UID????????? PID??? PPID? C STIME TTY????????? TIME CMD

python???????? 1?????? 0? 0 10:07 ???????? 00:00:00 /bin/sh -c python main.py

python???????? 6?????? 1? 0 10:07 ???????? 00:00:00 python main.py

python??????? 22?????? 0? 4 10:09 pts/0??? 00:00:00 /bin/bash

python??????? 28????? 22? 0 10:09 pts/0??? 00:00:00 ps -ef

[root@master flask-demo]# ps -ef | grep python

root??????? 1045?????? 1? 0 Oct30 ???????? 00:01:12 /usr/libexec/platform-python -Es /usr/sbin/tuned -l -P

root??????? 3282?????? 1? 0 Oct30 ???????? 00:00:01 /usr/libexec/platform-python /usr/libexec/rhsmd

snj????? 4086721 4086700? 0 05:07 ???????? 00:00:00 /bin/sh -c python main.py

snj????? 4086767 4086721? 0 05:07 ???????? 00:00:00 python main.py

root???? 4090010 3475369? 0 05:08 pts/2??? 00:00:00 grep --color=auto python

k8s yaml

spec下有针对pod的securityContext，

containers下也有针对容器的ssecurityContext字段

k8s 解决docker 程序外露问题，因为容器外部是 pod

实操（runAsUser）

---

apiVersion: apps/v1 # 版本号

kind: Deployment # 类型

metadata: # 元数据

? name: rq-deployment # deployment的名称

? namespace: test # 命名类型

spec: # 详细描述

? replicas: 2 # 副本数量

? selector: # 选择器，通过它指定该控制器可以管理哪些Pod

??? matchLabels: # Labels匹配规则

????? app: flask-python-pod

? template: # 模块 当副本数据不足的时候，会根据下面的模板创建Pod副本

??? metadata:

????? labels:

??????? app: flask-python

??? spec:

????? securityContext:

??????? runAsUser: 1000

????? containers:

??????? - name: flask-python # 容器名称

????????? image: flask-python:v1 # 容器需要的镜像地址

[root@master cks]# kubectl apply -f sc-deploy.yaml

deployment.apps/rq-deployment created

[root@master cks]# kubectl get deploy -n test

NAME??????????? READY?? UP-TO-DATE?? AVAILABLE?? AGE

rq-deployment?? 2/2???? 2??????????? 2?????????? 2m37s

[root@master cks]# kubectl get pod -n test

NAME???????????????????????????? READY?? STATUS??? RESTARTS????? AGE

rq-deployment-77b8f8dfbd-6vhvv?? 1/1???? Running?? 0???????????? 2m18s

rq-deployment-77b8f8dfbd-vfvz7?? 1/1???? Running?? 0???????????? 2m19s

web-seccomp????????????????????? 1/1???? Running?? 1 (22h ago)?? 46h

[root@master cks]# id 1000

uid=1000(snj) gid=1000(snj) groups=1000(snj)

[root@master cks]# kubectl exec -n test rq-deployment-77b8f8dfbd-6vhvv -- id

uid=1000(python) gid=1000(python) groups=1000(python)

k8s 解决docker 程序外露问题

[root@master cks]# kubectl exec -n test rq-deployment-77b8f8dfbd-6vhvv -- ps -ef

UID?????????PID???PPID??C STIME TTY??????????TIME CMD

python????????1??????0??0 10:27 ?????????00:00:00 /bin/sh -c python main.py

python????????7??????1??0 10:27 ?????????00:00:00 python main.py

python???????56??????0??0 10:34 ?????????00:00:00 ps -ef

[root@master cks]# ps -ef | grep python

root????????1045???????1??0 Oct30 ?????????00:01:12 /usr/libexec/platform-python -Es /usr/sbin/tuned -l -P

root????????3282???????1??0 Oct30 ?????????00:00:01 /usr/libexec/platform-python /usr/libexec/rhsmd

root?????4187675 3475369??0 05:32 pts/2????00:00:00 grep --color=auto python

避免使用特权容器

privileged

apiVersion: v1

kind: Pod

metadata:

? labels:

??? run: sc-cap

? name: sc-cap

? namespace: test

spec:

? containers:

? - image: busybox:1.30

??? name: sc-cap

??? command:

??? - sleep

??? - 12h

??? securityContext:

????? privileged: true? # 开启特权模式

????? # 特权模式：在特权模式下运行容器,特权容器中的进程本质上相当于主机上的 root???????

???????启用特权模式就意味着，你要为容器提供了访问Liux内核的所有能力，这是很危险的，为了减少系统调用的供给，可以使用Capabilities为容器赋予仅所需的能力。

Capabilities 单独分配特权权限

Linux Capabilities: Capabilities 是一个内核级别的权限，它允许对内核调用权

限进行更细粒度的控制，而不是简单地以oot身份能力授权。

Capabilities 包括更改文件权限、控制网络子系统和执行系统管理等功能。在

securityContext中，可以添加或删除Capabilities,做到容器精细化权限控制。

CAP_ 这个可以省略

apiVersion: v1

kind: Pod

metadata:



? labels:

??? run: sc-cap

? name: sc-cap

? namespace: test

spec:

? containers:

? - image: busybox:1.30

??? name: sc-cap

??? command:

??? - sleep

??? - 12h

??? securityContext:



????? capabilities:

??????? add: ["SYS_ADMIN"]???

??????? # SYS_ADMIN 允许执行系统管理任务，如加载或卸

载文件系统、设置磁盘配额等

实操

先创建一个没有权限的

[root@master ~]#? kubectl run busybox? -n test? --image=busybox:1.30 -- sleep 12h

pod/busybox created

[root@master ~]# kubectl get pod -n test

NAME????????? READY?? STATUS??? RESTARTS????? AGE

busybox?????? 1/1???? Running?? 0???????????? 4s

web-seccomp?? 1/1???? Running?? 1 (23h ago)?? 47h

[root@master ~]# kubectl exec -it -n test busybox /bin/sh

kubectl exec [POD] [COMMAND] is DEPRECATED and will be removed in a future version. Use kubectl exec [POD] -- [COMMAND] instead.



/ # mount tmpfs /tmp

mount: permission denied (are you root?)

通过 privileged 赋予权限

apiVersion: v1

kind: Pod

metadata:

? labels:

??? run: sc-cap

? name: sc-cap

? namespace: test

spec:

? containers:

? - image: busybox:1.30

??? name: sc-cap

??? command:

??? - sleep

??? - 12h

??? securityContext:

????? privileged: true? # 开启特权模式

????? # 特权模式：在特权模式下运行容器,特权容器中的进程本质上相当于主机上的 root??????

[root@master ~]# kubectl apply -f sc-cap.yaml

pod/sc-cap created

[root@master ~]# kubectl get pod -n test

NAME????????? READY?? STATUS??? RESTARTS????? AGE

busybox?????? 1/1???? Running?? 0???????????? 5m51s

sc-cap??????? 1/1???? Running?? 0???????????? 5s

web-seccomp?? 1/1???? Running?? 1 (24h ago)?? 2d

[root@master ~]# kubectl exec -it -n test sc-cap /bin/sh

kubectl exec [POD] [COMMAND] is DEPRECATED and will be removed in a future version. Use kubectl exec [POD] -- [COMMAND] instead.

/ # mount test /test

mount: mounting test on /test failed: No such file or directory

# 原先是 mount: permission denied (are you root?)

通过 capabilities 赋予权限

apiVersion: v1

kind: Pod

metadata:

? labels:

??? run: sc-cap

? name: sc-cap

? namespace: test

spec:

? containers:

? - image: busybox:1.30

??? name: sc-cap

??? command:

??? - sleep

??? - 12h

??? securityContext:

????? capabilities:

??????? add: ["SYS_ADMIN"]???

??????? # SYS_ADMIN 允许执行系统管理任务，如加载或卸载文件系统、设置磁盘配额等

[root@master ~]# kubectl apply -f sc-cap.yaml

pod/sc-cap created

[root@master ~]# kubectl get pod -n test

NAME????????? READY?? STATUS??? RESTARTS????? AGE

busybox?????? 1/1???? Running?? 0???????????? 9m18s

sc-cap??????? 1/1???? Running?? 0???????????? 5s

web-seccomp?? 1/1???? Running?? 1 (24h ago)?? 2d

[root@master ~]# kubectl exec -it -n test sc-cap /bin/sh

kubectl exec [POD] [COMMAND] is DEPRECATED and will be removed in a future version. Use kubectl exec [POD] -- [COMMAND] instead.

/ # mount test /test

mount: mounting test on /test failed: No such file or directory

查看容器内拥有的权限

[root@master ~]# docker run -d centos sleep 24h

Unable to find image 'centos:latest' locally

latest: Pulling from library/centos

a1d0c7532777: Pull complete

Digest: sha256:a27fd8080b517143cbbbab9dfb7c8571c40d67d534bbdee55bd6c473f432b177

Status: Downloaded newer image for centos:latest

c196fab47974a3a2624f6d746847130650040223946b38806e70e420393edc4c

[root@master ~]# docker ps | grep centos

c196fab47974?? centos????????????????????????????????????????????? "sleep 24h"????????????? 2 minutes ago?? Up 2 minutes???????????? lucid_lamarr

[root@master ~]# docker exec -it? c1 /bin/bash

[root@c196fab47974 /]# capsh --print

Current: = cap_chown,cap_dac_override,cap_fowner,cap_fsetid,cap_kill,cap_setgid,cap_setuid,cap_setpcap,cap_net_bind_service,cap_net_raw,cap_sys_chroot,cap_mknod,cap_audit_write,cap_setfcap+ep

Bounding set =cap_chown,cap_dac_override,cap_fowner,cap_fsetid,cap_kill,cap_setgid,cap_setuid,cap_setpcap,cap_net_bind_service,cap_net_raw,cap_sys_chroot,cap_mknod,cap_audit_write,cap_setfcap

Ambient set =

Securebits: 00/0x0/1'b0

?secure-noroot: no (unlocked)

?secure-no-suid-fixup: no (unlocked)

?secure-keep-caps: no (unlocked)

?secure-no-ambient-raise: no (unlocked)

uid=0(root)

gid=0(root)

groups=0(root)



# Current 就是所拥有的权限，对比宿主机来说少很多

只读挂载容器文件系统

防止恶意二进制文件创建???????

apiVersion: v1

kind: Pod

metadata:

? labels:

??? run: sc-cap

? name: sc-cap

? namespace: test

spec:

? containers:

? - image: busybox:1.30

??? name: sc-cap

??? command:

??? - sleep

??? - 12h

??? securityContext:

????? readOnlyRootFilesystem: true

?测试

[root@master ~]# kubectl apply -f sc-cap.yaml

pod/sc-cap created

[root@master ~]# kubectl get pod -n test

NAME????????? READY?? STATUS??? RESTARTS?????? AGE

busybox?????? 1/1???? Running?? 1 (150m ago)?? 14h

sc-cap??????? 1/1???? Running?? 0????????????? 5s

web-seccomp?? 1/1???? Running?? 2 (14h ago)??? 2d14h

[root@master ~]# kubectl exec -it -n test sc-cap /bin/sh

kubectl exec [POD] [COMMAND] is DEPRECATED and will be removed in a future version. Use kubectl exec [POD] -- [COMMAND] instead.

/ # ls

bin?? dev?? etc?? home? proc? root? sys?? tmp?? usr?? var

/ # touch a

touch: a: Read-only file system

文章来源:https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_48297181/article/details/135479319
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